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RACIAL INTEGRATION OF PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS
THE PROBLEM

An element of our cherished freedom of association' is the right to
be discriminatory in our selection of associates. But this, as with
any other right, is subject to abuse. When are we guiding our own
activities by the exercise of discretion, which the law permits, and
when are we exercising this power to deny rights to another, which
the law prohibits? When will the courts interfere in the internal
affairs of an association? Or, as more narrowly drawn here, is there
any basis for judicial interference in the membership policies of a
professional association to prohibit racial discrimination?
The answer lies in a social context; it will be couched in legal
niceties. What, then, is the present status of the professional association and in what direction is it heading? This question contemplates
an examination of judicial treatment of membership policies of the
professional association in the past and speculation on the possibilities
open to the future.
Doctors Edward L. Young and Ben Selling, National Chairman
and Chairman of the Massachusetts Chapter of the American Medical
Association respectively, enunciated the problem in a statement to
the Senate Commerce Committee:2
Of particular concern to us is the discrimination within
Denial of membership in State and
the medical profession ....
local medical societies . . . excludes the Negro physician from

use of his community hospital (which generally requires that
he have medical society membership). It further isolates him
from normal professional and scientific contacts....
Although the American Medical Association prohibits race
or color as a condition of membership, it is open only to physicians permitted to join state and local societies. Thus Negroes
are excluded from the American Medical Association by virtue
of local decisions over which the American Medical Association considers itself without jurisdiction.
There is at present a relative absence of Negro lawyers in this
country. A recent commentary attributes this, in part, to a feeling by
I. See Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 167,
173 (1961) for a brief discussion of the constitutional basis of freedom of association. See also FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §329 n.27 (1963) in which the
author states: "The two concepts of speech and association are discussed as one,

and cases are used interchangeably."
2. Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 88th Cong.,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

1

1965]

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 7
NOTES

3
the Negro that he has no place in the professional world. Much of
this arises from prejudices, real or imagined, of courts, juries, and
clients -both Negro and white. 4 But to conclude that part of the
attitude arises from an exclusion by the professional association
does not seem unjustified. How can a Negro become an integral part
of the professional community if he is excluded from the local professional association?
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a slightly different context,
adequately states the problem: 5

There appears to be a certain opprobrium on any physician
who is not a member of his County Society and the State
Association. As a non-member, he may not procure insurance
protection against malpractice, he is barred from membership
in the American Medical Association, [and] is generally
frowned upon by other members of the profession....
To meet the challenge of equality, there must be an effort made at
all levels to demonstrate that there is a place for the Negro in the
professional world.
THE RurE
We begin with the proposition that the right to carry on a lawful
trade or to engage in a lawful occupation is a right to which the law
will extend protection against unreasonable discriminatory interference. 6 When membership in a professional association is a statutory
prerequisite to general practice, the interest of arbitrarily selecting
members collides directly with the right to engage in the profession.
This is an involuntary association in which all qualified persons have
a general right to membership; a right that can only be denied consistent with the reasonable rules and regulations governing qualifications.7 The interest of the individual to practice is paramount.
An association organized under no legal compulsion is characterized as a voluntary association. The courts have generally favored
a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of these associations.8
Ist Sess. 1258 (1964).
3. Carl &Callahan, Negroes and the Law, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 250 (1965).
4. Ibid.

5. Walker v. Medical Soc'y, 247 Ala. 169, 175, 22 So. 2d 715, 720 (1945).
6. DEFUNIAK, MODERN EQUITY §41 (1956); WALsH, EQUITY §§41, 44 (1930).
7. People ex reL Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. 187 (Ct. App. 1865).
8. Walker v. Medical Soc'y, 247 Ala. 169, 22 So. 2d 715 (1945); Greenwood v.
Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 Pac. 823 (1925); Trautwein v.
Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (1956); McKane v. Adams, 123 N.Y.
609, 25 N.E. 1057 (1890); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920);
Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 NAV.2d 315 (1957). See DEFUNIAK, MODERN
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The legal proposition often pronounced is that:9
Membership in a voluntary association is a privilege which
the society may accord or withhold at its pleasure, and a court
of equity will not interfere to compel the admission of a person
not regularly elected, even though the arbitrary rejection of
the candidate may prejudice his material interests, where no
rights of property or of person are affected, and no rights of
citizenship are infringed upon.
The relation between the so-called voluntary professional association
and the individual aspiring to membership therein is the theme of this
note.
Of Property
Obviously, the rule does not answer the basic question: When are
property rights affected? Even more fundamental is a consideration
of the property concept itself. This concept has often been recognized
as a "bootstraps" operation."' The right does not exist until the law
is willing to extend protection." Jerome Frank epitomized this an2
alysis when he characterized "a legal right... [as] a lawsuit won. ... ,1
Once the membership relation is established, the courts have
prevented exclusions not consistent with the reasonable rules and
regulations of the association.- Judicial interference here is justified
on grounds of damage to a property interest either in a contractual relation- or in concrete benefits accompanying membership. 15
There is a property right in remaining a member. As a general proposition, however, there exists no similar property right for the hopeful
17
member. 6 Why? What social justification exists for the legal rule?
What competing values are being reconciled?
EQUITY §63

(1956); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43
HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930).

9. Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 172, 233 Pac. 823,
828 (1925).
10. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 797, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 493 (Sup. Ct. 1950) in which the court states: "However, 'property rights,' as has often been pointed out, are rights which are recognized and protected by the courts ....

The designation is therefore more in the

nature of a legal conclusion than a description."
11. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1957) defining "property" as "an
aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government."
12. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 9 (1949).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Blenko v. Schmeltz, 362 Pa. 365, 67 A.2d 99 (1949).
Ibid.
Ayres v. Order of United Workmen, 188 N.Y. 280, 80 N.E. 1020 (1907).
Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (1956).
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 33 (1881) suggests that: "Every important
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On the one hand, there is the interest of the group in complete
autonomy in the exercise of freedom of choosing members; on the
other hand, there is the interest of an individual in becoming a member of the group and gaining the benefits that accompany membership, or at least avoiding whatever opprobrium accompanies the
absence of membership. The public interest is manifested in the
conflicting desires to foster the autonomous association and, at the
same time, to regulate activities that have a relation to the public
welfare. As a general proposition, the courts have held implicitly that
the interest of selection outweighs, without more, the interest of
admission.'5
When additional factors are encountered, however, we begin to
find variations in application of the general proposition that membership may be accorded or withheld at the pleasure of the association.
In particular, the right to practice the profession is a legally protected
interest.19
Although there is some authority to the contrary, 20 the prevailing
view has indicated that the practice of a profession is contemplated by
"trade" within the meaning of the antitrust laws.21 The motivation
for rejecting an individual from membership in the association has
been held material in proving allegations of an intent to conspire for
the purpose of restraining competition. 22 The association may be
arbitrary in refusing admission, but when the intent is malicious and
is accompanied by activities designed to injure the complainant's
right to practice his profession, the right of selection is no longer
23
immune from judicial scrutiny.
But the courts have gone much further in protecting the right
to practice. Relief has been afforded when membership in a volunprinciple which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of
more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be
sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to view of
public policy in the last analysis."
18. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
19. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
20. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103 (D. Ore.
1950), affd on other grounds,343 U.S. 326 (1952).
21. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
cert. granted, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), expressly reserving opinion whether the practice
of medicine and the rendering of medical services are "trade" within the Sherman
Act; United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940); Tatkin v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 326
P.2d 201 (1958); Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash.
2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
22. Tatkin v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 745, 326 P.2d 201 (1958).
23. Ibid.
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tary association is a prerequisite to practice in the public hospitals. 24
It is possible that relief may now be available, under certain circumstances, when the rule is promulgated by private hospitals.

25

In Ware

v. Benedikt,26 the Supreme Court of Arkansas eliminated a hospital
bylaw requiring a recommendation from the medical association as
27
a prerequisite to staff privileges, saying:
In holding the by-law unreasonable and discriminatory
we do not mean to infer that a public hospital may not validly
enact rules and regulations applicable to all physicians and
surgeons alike and which bear a reasonable and fundamental relation to the safety, interest and welfare of patients and the
general public. The by-law in question does not meet this test.
Until recently, relief was considered complete as long as the plaintiff was allowed to practice in the hospitals. Compelling admission
to the association was apparently not a necessary adjunct to the protection of the right to practice.
In a leading New Jersey case, Falcone v. Middlesex County Medi-

cal Society,28 the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a mandatory injunction compelling admission to membership in the defendant society. The plaintiff had been rejected because he held a degree in
osteopathic medicine in addition to a degree approved by the American Medical Association. The Middlesex Society was voluntary in
the sense that one was not compelled to join in order to receive a
license to practice medicine in the state; but, in fact, that society had
monopolistic control over the local hospitals to the extent that a
physician not a member of the society was not allowed the privileges
of the hospitals. 29 On this basis the society was considered involuntary.30 Prior to this decision, such associations were characterized as in-

voluntary only when membership as a prerequisite to practice was
required by law. 31 The court could have denied relief in this case and
forced the plaintiff to bring an action against the hospitals to have
the rule eliminated as was done in Benedikt.
24. Ware v. Benedikt, 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955); Hamilton County
Hosp. v. Andrews, 227 Ind. 217, 84 N.E.2d 469 (1949).
25. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Long, State Action, State Law, and the
Private Hospital, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1433 (1964).
26. 225 Ark. 185, 280 S.W.2d 234 (1955).
27. Id. at 189, 280 S.W.2d at 236.
28. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961); accord, Blende v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964).
29. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
(1961).
30. Ibid.
31. People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. 187 (Ct. App. 1865).
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By intervening in the membership policies of the society, this
court apparently went beyond mere protection of the right to practice
the profession. Does this decision point in the direction of a finding
that all professional associations are involuntary per se? Or will such
a finding be limited to the narrow facts presented - when the society
exerts control over practice in the county hospitals? Will the courts
following the reasoning in Falcone begin to recognize that membership in the professional association, although not a prerequisite to
the right to practice, is of such significance that it will become a part
of that right?
32
There is language in the case to justify such a conclusion:
It must be borne in mind that the County Medical Society
is not a private voluntary membership association with which
the public has little or no concern. It is an association with
which the public is highly concerned and which engages in activities vitally affecting the health and welfare of the people.
The decision was based on a search into the nature of the organization itself to determine whether this is really what is meant by the
term, "private voluntary association." This does not mean that the
courts would initiate an inquiry into the membership policies of
purely private organizations, such as the social fraternity or the private club. In fact, the court distinguished the nature of the medical
society from those organizations, referring specifically to Trautwein v.
Harbourt:33 "The intimate personal relationships which pervaded
the social, religious, and fraternal organizations were hardly in evidence and the individual's opportunity of earning a livelihood and
serving society in his chosen trade or profession appeared as the controlling policy consideration." 34 The decision does, however, indicate
a willingness to reassess the nature of the professional association,
with the possible result that admission to membership therein will be
a property right, that is, a legally protected right.35 This will involve,
in each case, an examination of the effect of lack of membership in
the particular association on the right to practice the profession. A
significant restriction on this right could lead to the conclusion that
the association is not, in fact, a voluntary association.
Should the professional association be classified as an involuntary
association in the sense that every professional licensed to practice must be accepted; should it have complete discretion over the
32. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 NJ. 582, 596, 170 A.2d 791,
799 (1961).
33. 40 NJ. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (1956).
34. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 NJ. 582, 596, 170 A.2d 791,
799 (1961).
35. See authorities cited notes 10, 11, 12 supra.
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selection of associates as a private club; or should it be held to some
standard of reasonableness consistent with the purposes of the organization? This is the dilemma.
Perhaps what was once characterized as a voluntary professional
association could best be reclassified into a third category - for want
of a more descriptive term, a semi-voluntary association. This would
distinguish it on one side from the association that is involuntary in
the sense that membership is absolutely essential in order to practice
the profession, and on the other side from the association that is
purely voluntary or private in the sense that it is organized primarily
for the benefit and pleasure of its members. The professional association partakes of the qualities of each. It is a hybrid organization. Its activities are voluntary, yet the orientation toward public
service and its effect, in varying degrees, on the right to practice,
vests the public with some interest in regulating these activities.
Were the courts to recognize this dichotomy, with the result that
an applicant has some right, but not an absolute right, to membership, they will be faced with the second, more perplexing problem of
determining what would be a reasonable ground for rejection. Conceivably, every disappointed applicant would have a cause of action
against the association, at least to have it show cause for his rejection.
Then some sort of balance must be derived from a consideration of
the right of selection and the reason for the rejection. The court
would have no problem deciding that exclusion on the basis of race
is unreasonable, but other possible variables would pose a most difficult judicial task. For the prospective Negro member, however, the
over-all problem can be resolved without resort to this imponderable.
Of Citizenship
A different approach to the problem of access to the professional
association has been raised in two recent cases. 36 This is the contention that even professional associations not characterized as involuntary have a duty to safeguard rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.3 In
particular, they have a duty not to discriminate in their selection of
members on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Freedom of
association is manifested by the recognition that a person not deemed
a worthy individual can be rejected without the duty of justifying
that rejection; the freedom is tempered only by the prohibitions of
36. Bell v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Hawkins
v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
37. Ibid.
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the fourteenth amendment. The constitutional basis will hinge on a
finding of state action in the activities of the society.
If the fourteenth amendment is limited only to the actions of state
officials acting in their official capacity, the amendment will be so
watered as to make its prohibitions meaningless.38 Yet, if the private
individual is subject to the prohibitions, Congress would have the
power to enact detailed codes for the regulation of all phases of conduct. 39 But where is the action of the state to end and the action of
private individuals to begin? Any action carried on by a private in40
dividual under compulsion of state law is considered state action.
State action has been found when state courts upheld private discrimination.41 Under certain circumstances, even state inaction has
been found sufficient to invoke the state action concept. 2 But in all of
these cases, clearly the action was carried on by the state, or was at
least regulated to some significant extent by the state.
In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,43 the Supreme Court
of the United States cast aside these limitations and opened the door
to a finding of state action when individuals act in their private capacity. The Court held that the exclusion of a Negro patron from
a restaurant, privately owned, but operating in a public building
owned by a state agency violated the prohibitions of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The Court did not
expressly redefine the state action concept, but holding as it did under
the circumstances of that case the Court made a significant departure
from prior limitations imposed on the application of the concept.45
Now, can a Negro who has been denied membership in his professional association find relief in a factual situation demonstrating that
these associations are neither so private nor voluntary as the courts
once considered them?
In Bell v. Georgia Dental Association,"o the Federal District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia found state action in the statutory participation of the dental association in the election to the
Georgia Board of Dental Examiners.4 The statute required the
38. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rv.
1083 (1960).

39. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
40. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
41. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1

(1948).
42. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Catlette v. United
States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).

43. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
44. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S."715 (1961).
45. See Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. Rlv. 347 (1964).
46. 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
47. GA. CODE §84-702 (1963).
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Governor to appoint members to the state agency from the nominations made by the society. On the basis of this finding, the court
required the dental association to admit the plaintiff to membership.
But the court was quick to add that absent this statutory participation
48
the plaintiff was not entitled to relief.
In Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Society, 49 the plaintiff
sought injunctive relief requiring the defendant societies to admit
him to membership on the ground that he had been denied equal
protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. He had been
practicing dentistry in Charlotte, North Carolina, since 1948; his
professional qualifications were never questioned. 50 He was denied
51
The court found an
membership allegedly on racial grounds.
52
relief.
absence of state action and denied
53
Hawkins relied heavily on Bell v. Georgia Dental Association
decided just a few months before. The only distinction between
Hawkins and Bell was a provision in a Georgia statute that the society would recommend members for the Georgia Board of Dental
Examiners to the Governor. 54 On that basis the cases are easily distinguishable; yet, as a practical matter, the two associations are
similar in every other respect. It is also noteworthy to point out that
the North Carolina Legislature had enacted legislation 55 similar to
the Georgia legislation, but prior to this decision, had amended that
statute. 56 The effect of the amendment was to withdraw the North
Carolina Dental Society from statutory participation in the election
to the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners. The Hawkins
court found no evidence that these societies exercise control or authority over the nomination or election of the members of the
board. 57 Since the amendment, however, every member of the board,
as before, has been a member of the society. 58 The exercise of de
facto power through sheer influence and numbers does in fact give
the societies the control that the court could not find.

48. Bell v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299, 301 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
49. 230 F. Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
50. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 1, Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F.
Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
51. Id. at 3.
52. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
53. 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
54. GA. CODE §84-702 (1963).
55. N.C. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 66, §1.
56.

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§90-22 (1964).

57. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 807 (W.D.N.C.
1964).
58. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 4, Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F.
Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
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In a recent significant case, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital, 9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Burton,
found a privately owned and operated hospital under the purview
of the fourteenth amendment. The court relied heavily on the
hospital's participation in the Hill-Burton program. 60 The case
represents an application of the inroad, opened up by Burton, into
"quasi-public" bodies, voluntarily performing a public function. It
also represents a departure from previous state court decisions, which
denied relief to plaintiffs, involving similar private hospitals. 61
In Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial
Hospital,62 decided in 1958, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina found no state action and ruled
that the hospital was not required to admit Negro physicians. The
hospital, originally owned and operated by the county, had been sold
to private individuals. A reverter to the county was entered in the
deed to insure the continued operation of the hospital. Some three
years later, in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville,63 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found a similar reverter in a sale by the city to
private individuals for the operation of a golf course sufficient to
invoke the state action concept. In light of this holding and Burton,
Eaton again brought an action in 1963.64 The district court, relying
on the 1958 decision, dismissed the action saying there had been no
change of facts or circumstances between 1958 and 1963.65 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis of
Hampton, Burton, and Simkins.66 This would seem to demonstrate
that the lower court has not recognized the extent to which Burton
has changed, if not the principles of law to be applied, then at least
the policy and manner in which these principles are to be applied.
The Hawkins court set forth the test to be applied at the outset:67
Is the State of North Carolina in any of its manifestations
so involved in the conduct of the North Carolina Dental Society or of the Second District Dental Society that the activities
59. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
60. 78 Stat. 447 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §291 (1958).
61. Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1958);
West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Natale v. Sisters of
Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952).
62. 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
63. 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
64. Eaton v. Grubbs, 216 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
65. Ibid.
66. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964), reversing 216 F. Supp. 465

(E.D.N.C. 1963).
67.

Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 806 (W.D.N.C.

1964).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss3/7

10

Wolfe: Racial Integration of Professional Associations
[Vol. XVIII

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

of these societies are also the activities of the State of North
Carolina and performed under its protection, and whether or
not either society is the instrumentality or the agent of the
State in a strict sense?
The societies made recommendations to the Governor for appointment to various state medical and health agencies.6 They instituted
fund raising drives for the state dental school. 69 They made recommendations for training and teaching facilities in the hospitals of
the state.70 Their members were consistently and exclusively elected
to membership to the State Board of Dental Examiners.71 Yet the
court found these activities insufficient to warrant judicial interference. 7 2 The court concluded: "It is in the public interest that
recommendations be made, but where there is no legal obligation or
duty to act favorably there is no state action on the part of the
voluntary citizen or group." 73
In Guilloiy v. Tulane University of Louisiana14 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana applied a much less
75
stringent test:
The law is clear that purely private organizations performing purely private activities may freely associate themselves
with a State in such a way as to make that private organization,
in its private activity, subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court found insufficient state-association contacts in that case, but
it is not clear that this was necessary for the decision76 It is abundantly clear that judicial intervention is no longer limited to private
action only when it is under compulsion of state law77
68.

Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 6-7, Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230

F. Supp. 805 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 808-09
(W.D.N.C. 1964).

73. Id. at 811.
74. 212 F. Supp. 674, 682 (E.D. La. 1962).
75.

Id. at 682. (Emphasis added.)

76. Tulane University was willing to admit Negroes but was prevented from
doing so by state statute. Once the statute was held unconstitutional the remedy
was complete. Thus, subsequent discussion of state action is dictum.

77. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Eaton v.
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,

323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Hampton v. City
of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.,
280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); Guillory v. Tulane Univ. of La. 212 F. Supp. 674
(E.D. La. 1962).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 7
1965]

NOTES

An analysis of these recent decisions leads to the conclusion that
the courts have begun to abandon the state action concept as the
final arbiter.78 Rather, this concept will fade into a legal conclusion
resulting from decisions based on public policy - if its use is continued at all. The test is not merely finding state action in the sense
that the state itself must have been directly involved in the discrimination. The courts have now initiated an inquiry into the nature of the
°
activity, its relationship to the public, and the public's interest in it3
The courts have invoked a balancing test between the right of local
autonomy and the duty to prevent discrimination in areas in which
the public is vitally interested.
The principle is basically the same as before; the courts will still
refuse to enter the arena of purely private conflict. But the court
must now determine in each case the extent to which the public is
affected and whether there is sufficient public interest to warrant
prohibition under the fourteenth amendment. There is no formula
and, as said by the Court in Burton, each case must turn on its own
peculiar facts.80 Nevertheless, operating under these new considerations, a great many more acts may now be considered prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment.
The court in Hawkins dismissed summarily some seventeen citations relied upon by the plaintiff. The court found those cases not
8
in point because they all involved "state action." ' The court is
begging the question; it never entered a discussion of how those
cases differed from the case at bar. They are, at least implicitly,
distinguishing on the basis of degree of state action, yet they base the
dismissal on the finding that there is no state action.
The state action test can no longer be answered with a simple
"yes" or "no." In almost every instance, there will be some measure
of "state action." It may take the form of regulation,2 enforcement,83
inaction,84 or recently, public involvement and state-association relationship. 5 The court can no longer ask "whether or not the society
80
is the instrument or agent of the State in a strict sense." The question, rather, is: "How much?"
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. R.v. 347 (1963).
Cases cited note 77 supra.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 810 (W.D.N.C.

1964).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Cases cited note 41 supra.
Cases cited note 42 supra.
Cases cited note 77 supra.
Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 230 F. Supp. 805, 806 (W.D.N.C.

1964).
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Perhaps, in the professional association there is not so much involvement with the state or public as was found in the other recent
decisions in which plaintiffs were granted relief. On the other hand,
the association is not a social club. The association is serving a public function in its private capacity. There is no doubt that the state
and the public are vitally interested in the activities of these societies.
There is no doubt that the State of North Carolina is relying on these
societies to a significant extent for assistance in regulating and promoting the practice of dentistry. Application of a state-association
"contacts" test could have resulted in a finding for the plaintiff. The
court never met this issue.
A section specifically directed at discrimination in professional
associations87 was proffered in the 1964 Civil Rights Bill. s8 But this
section was completely deleted from the final enactment. Relief must
come, for the present at least, from the courts. The courts should no
longer emphasize direct involvement by the state. Rather, the focal
point should be the contacts with the state and the interest of the
public in what might be termed a "quasi-public" body.
In State ex rel. Cotonio v. Louisiana Bar Association,9 decided in

1904, the Louisiana Supreme Court denying the requested injunction
to membership to the petitioner, stated:90
The Louisiana Bar Association is a private corporation and
as no public duties are imposed upon it by its act of voluntary incorporation it cannot be considered as a quasi public
corporation.

The intention to benefit the incorporators, the profession,
and the administration of public justice does not make the
association quasi public. Hence the question of membership
must be left to the determination of the association under its
own rules and regulations.
Are societal needs being satisfied by a continuation of this policy?
Clearly, it no longer reflects the spirit of the recent state action cases.
What is law but an approximation of social values? When that law
no longer reflects societal desires and needs, should that law not be
changed? Is the status quo more important than a recognition of
and a response to a changing social structure?
JEROME R. WoLFE
87. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2359 (1964).
88. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. 1971 (1964).
89. 111 La. 967, 36 So. 50 (1904).
90. Id. at 970, 36 So. at 51.
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